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Abstract 
 
Objective: New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM)-producing Gram-negative bacteria have 
spread globally and pose a significant public health threat. There is a need to better define 
risk factors and outcomes of NDM-1 clinical infection. We assessed risk factors for 
nosocomial infection with NDM-1-producers and associated in-hospital mortality. 
Methods: A matched case-control study was conducted during a nosocomial outbreak of 
NDM-1-producers in South Africa. All patients from whom NDM-1-producers were 
identified were considered (n=105). Cases included patients admitted during the study period 
in whom NDM-1 producing Gram-negative bacteria were isolated from clinical specimens 
collected ≥48 hours after admission, and where surveillance definitions for healthcare-
associated infections were met. Controls were matched for age, sex, date of hospital 
admission and intensive-care admission.  Conditional logistic regression was used to identify 
risk factors for NDM-1 clinical infection and associated in-hospital mortality.  
Findings: 38 cases and 68 controls were included. Klebsiella pneumoniae was the most 
common NDM-1-producer (28/38, 74%). Cases had longer mean hospital stays (44.0 vs 13.3 
days; P < 0.001) and ICU stays (32.5 vs 8.3 days; P < 0.001). Adjusting for co-morbid 
disease, the in-hospital mortality of cases was significantly higher than controls (55.3% vs 
14.7%; AOR, 11.29; P < 0.001). Higher Charlson co-morbidity index score (5.2 vs 4.1; AOR, 
1·59; CI 95 % 1.15 – 2.18), more mechanical ventilation days (7.47 vs 0.94 days; AOR, 1.32; 
CI 95 % 1.10 – 1.59) and piperacillin/tazobactam exposure (11.03 vs 1.05 doses; AOR, 1.08; 
CI 95 % 1.02 – 1.15) were associated with NDM-1 infection on multivariate analysis. Cases 
had a significantly higher likelihood of in-hospital mortality when the NDM-1-producer was 
Klebsiella pneumoniae (AOR, 16.57; CI 95 % 2.12 – 129.6), or when they had a bloodstream 
infection (AOR, 8.84; CI 95 % 1.09 – 71.55).  
Conclusion: NDM-1 infection is associated with significant in-hospital mortality. Risk 
factors for hospital-associated infection include the presence of co-morbid disease, 
mechanical ventilation and piperacillin/tazobactam exposure. Rational use of intensive care, 
medical devises and antibiotics are essential in reducing the transmission and emergence of 
NDM-1 and other drug resistance Gram-negative bacteria. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
 
A recent World Health Organization report has shown that antimicrobial resistance has risen 
significantly around the globe and notes that “[a] post-antibiotic era—in which common 
infections and minor injuries can kill—far from being an apocalyptic fantasy, is instead a 
very real possibility for the 21st century”.[1] Antimicrobial resistance, particularly among 
Gram-negative bacteria is a growing clinical problem and pose a significant public health 
threat.
[2]
 Although there has been recent drug development to address multi-drug resistant 
Gram-negatives, it is unlikely that these treatments would become commercially available in 
the near future.
[3]
 With the last entirely new class of antimicrobial drug developed almost 
three decades ago, it is extremely important to reduce the spread of resistance through 
rational infection prevention and control practices informed by an understanding of disease 
epidemiology.
[1]
 
Infectious diseases are caused by viruses, fungi, parasites and bacteria. Enterobacteriaceae 
are a family of rod-shaped Gram-negative bacteria and include a range of clinically important 
pathogens such as Klebsiella Pneumoniae and Escherichia coli. New Delhi Metallo-β-
lactamase (NDM–1) is an enzyme produced by Enterobacteriaceae carrying the blaNDM-1 
gene which inactivates all β-lactam and carbapenem antibiotics through hydrolysis and is 
classified an Ambler Class B metallo-β-lactamase.[4] It is one enzyme mediated mechanism 
by which Enterobacteriaceae inhibits the action of carbapenems.  
NDM-1 was first described in 2008 in a Swedish patient returning from New Delhi, India. 
Both E. coli and K. pneumoniae isolates from this patient carried the novel metallo-β-
lactamase gene (blaNDM-1).
[5]
 During the subsequent three years, NDM-1 had been reported in 
North America, Europe, South East Asia and Australia, with most early cases of NDM-1 
diagnosed in the UK having epidemiological links with the Indian sub-continent.
[6]
 The first 
NDM-1 case to be detected in South Africa occurred in an 86 year old male patient in 
September 2011.
[7]
  
blaNDM-1 is plasmid mediated and readily transferred between different members of the 
Enterobacteriaceae family and other Gram-negatives.
[6]
 It confers resistance to three major 
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classes of antibiotics – the β-lactams (including carbapenems), fluoroquinolones and 
aminoglycosides – typically reserving susceptibility to only colistin and tigecycline.[6] 
However, the effectiveness of colistin and tigecycline in the treatment of NDM-1 producers 
has not been established. Due to cost and restriction, these drugs are also not widely available 
in the South African public health sector. Therefore, NDM-1 producers pose a significant 
clinical challenge particularly in under-resourced settings. 
NDM-1 poses a major public health threat for at least three reasons. Firstly, the NDM-1 
resistance mechanism is highly transferable between various Enterobacteriaceae family 
members and confers high-level antimicrobial resistance to multiple classes of commonly 
used antibiotics. Secondly, the rapidity with which NDM-1 has spread globally. Lastly, 
Enterobacteriaceae are ubiquitous, constitute the most common gut commensals, and are 
responsible for the majority of clinically important bacterial infections in humans.
[6,8]
  
1.2 Justification  
In September 2012, a private hospital group approached the National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases’ Outbreak Unit via the National Department of Health to assist with 
the investigation and control of an outbreak of New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM-1) 
producing Enterobacteriaceae in three private hospitals in the greater Johannesburg area.  
Subsequently an investigation into all 105 cases which had been identified through the 
hospitals’ screening programmes were undertaken to establish possible risk factors for 
transmission of NDM-1 and inform recommendations for outbreak control. The outbreak 
investigation included a review of patient clinical and laboratory records as well as 
patient/relative structured telephonic interviews to establish past admissions and/or 
international travel history.  
The initial investigation provided some insights, but due to the lack of an appropriate 
comparator group it was not sufficient to clearly identify and quantify risk factors for NDM-1 
acquisition and its associated outcomes. A case-control study would provide stronger 
evidence to aid in understanding the epidemiology of NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae. 
A literature search suggested this to be the largest healthcare associated outbreak of NDM-1 
reported to date.
[9–11]
 Since the majority of cases were identified from the same healthcare 
facility and little is known about the epidemiology of NDM-1, it presented a unique 
opportunity to gain a better understanding of the factors associated with NDM-1 acquisition 
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and, in so doing, help inform strategies to prevent or control future outbreaks of multi-drug 
resistant organisms in South Africa and elsewhere. 
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
To identify risk factors associated with the acquisition of NDM-1 producing 
Enterobacteriaceae in a South African hospital and estimate its burden in terms of morbidity 
and mortality.    
The objectives of this study are: 
I. To describe a South African hospital-associated outbreak of NDM-1 producing 
Enterobacteriaceae, in  particular:  
a. Number of cases over time (epidemic curve); 
b. Description of case detection rates, average time to detection and average 
length of stay; 
c. Description of organisms found to be producing NDM-1; and a 
d. Description of site of NDM-1 infection; 
II. To describe the characteristics of confirmed cases and controls: 
a. Average length of stay for cases and controls 
b. Average time at risk for cases and controls 
c. Co-morbidities, as measured by Mortality Probability Models III and Charlson 
Scores, for cases and controls    
d. Average number of antibiotic doses received for cases and controls 
e. Average number of days cases and controls were exposed to selected invasive 
medical devises 
f. Number of in-hospital deaths amongst cases and controls  
III. To determine factors associated with infection by NDM-1 producing 
Enterobacteriaceae 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Communicable disease remains a major contributor to the global burden of disease. As 
argued in 2007 World Health Report, the  rise of emerging and re-emerging infectious 
diseases and drug resistant organisms poses a challenging threat to global health.
[12]
 This 
chapter provides a brief overview of relevant literature to contextualize the significance of 
NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae.  
2.2 Communicable Disease  
Despite major advances in the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases during the 20
th
 
century, communicable diseases “...continue to plague our modern world”.[13] Communicable 
diseases are major contributors to the global burden of disease and disproportionately affect 
developing countries and in particular sub-Saharan Africa,
[14]
 where infectious diseases 
remain the main reason for hospitalization and death.
[15]
 
In the broader context of globalization, emerging infectious diseases like Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (1981) and more recently Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(2001)
[16]
, pandemic influenza (2009) and Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (2012) pose 
a continuous threat to Global Health.
[16–18]
 As with newly emerging diseases, the growing 
problem of drug resistance undermine public health efforts in disease control and elimination. 
Drug resistant tuberculosis, for example, has emerged as a result of failed public health 
efforts to control the disease and threatens to derail global efforts in tuberculosis control.
[19]
   
Osram classically described three epidemiological transitions namely the i) age of pestilence 
and famine; ii) age of receding pandemics followed by iii) age of degenerative and man-made 
disease.
[20]
 Drivers of communicable disease in the third transition can broadly be understood 
by the following. Firstly, public health failures which result in the emergence of drug 
resistance. Secondly, environmental drivers such as globalization and climate change which 
contribute to a change in infectious disease epidemiology. Thirdly, social and demographic 
changes such as an aging population, urbanization and increased population density and the 
rise in non-communicable diseases which together change the susceptibility of populations to 
infectious diseases.
[21]
 Therefore, a dynamic evolutionary relationship exists between the 
infectious agent, host and environment in determining the spread and transmission of 
emerging infectious diseases and the rise of antimicrobial resistance.
[22]
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2.3 Burden of antimicrobial drug resistance and healthcare associated infections 
Multi-drug resistance comes with significant public health, clinical and resource 
implications.
[23,24]
 Although data from developed countries are lacking there is even less data 
from developing countries on the burden of antimicrobial resistance.
[25]
 A number of authors 
have suggested the burden of drug resistance to be greater in developing countries.
[25,26]
 As 
seen with methicillin resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, antibiotic resistance is typically born 
in the intensive care setting later spreading to the general hospital environment before 
entering the community.
[26,27]
 Local communities colonised with drug resistant organisms 
through travel transmit the resistance regionally and eventually globally.
[27]
 Infection with 
drug resistant organisms are typically associated with worse patient outcomes due to a 
reduction in the number and effectiveness of treatment options.
[28]
  For example, in a case 
control study, crude in-hospital mortality among patients with blood stream infection caused 
by carbapenem resistant K. Pneumonia was 72% versus 22% amongst matched controls 
without bacteraemia.
[29]
  
The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention defines healthcare associated infections “...as 
a localized or systemic condition resulting from an adverse reaction to the presence of an 
infectious agent(s) or its toxin(s). There must be no evidence that the infection was present or 
incubating at the time of admission to the acute care setting.”[30]  
Healthcare associated infections are associated with increased mortality and length of stay 
and therefore result in increased financial costs.
[31–38]
 For example, it has been estimated that 
the direct annual hospital costs of hospital-acquired Clostridium Difficile alone amounts to 
USD 1.1 billion in the United States
[39]
 and in the UK healthcare associated infections cost 
the National Health Service approximately £1 billion or approximately 1.4% of total health 
spend in 2003.
[6,40]
 It is not known what the economic cost of healthcare associated infections 
is in South Africa.  
Healthcare associated infections, beyond constituting a significant economic burden on health 
systems, are associated with high rates of morbidity and mortality. It has been estimated, 
based on a conservative mortality rate of 15% that healthcare associated infections “...rank 
amongst the most important causes of death in the developing world.”[26]     
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2.4 Antimicrobial drug resistance 
“Resistance is a nameless cloud that looms over otherwise controllable infections, but lacks the 
powerful status of a readily identifiable disease state to spur large-scale efforts of control”[23] 
2.4.1 Mechanisms of drug resistance 
Antimicrobials can be classified by their major mode of action as i) interfering with cell wall 
synthesis; ii) inhibiting protein synthesis; iii) interfering with nucleic acid synthesis; or iv) 
inhibiting of metabolic pathways.
[41]
 Resistance can be either innate or acquired. Innate 
resistance results from the intrinsic characteristics of the species, for example the 
chromosomally coded resistance genes and efflux pumps found in Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa.
[42]
 Under the selective pressure of antimicrobial agents, initially susceptible 
organisms may acquire genes encoding enzymes to inactivate antibiotics; efflux pumps to 
expel agents; or acquire altered cell walls.
[41]
 Thus susceptible microbial populations become 
resistant by natural mutation and subsequent selection.
[23]
 The complexity of various 
resistance mechanisms have increased substantially in response to increased antimicrobial 
usage.
[41]
  
Acquired resistance is most commonly associated with extra-chromosomal elements 
introduced by other bacteria.
[42]
 These transposable genetic elements, for example plasmids, 
transponsons and integrons, encoding for various drug resistant mechanism and are readily 
transferable to various bacteria.
[42]
 
2.4.2 Determinants of drug resistance 
Two years after the commercial introduction of penicillin in the 1940’s, penicillin-resistant 
strains of Staphylococcus aureus were isolated.
[43]
 Drug resistance has always been present as 
a result of natural genetic mutations, but has accelerated significantly since the introduction 
of antibiotic use due to an escalation of selective pressures on microbe populations.
[44]
  
Due to the high antimicrobial exposures microbes face in the hospital setting, these 
environments act as an ideal breading place for resistance with new resistant isolates typically 
first being identified from nosocomial infections.
[23]
 In the absence of wide spread antibiotic 
usage the emergence of a resistant isolate may be confined to an individual as the resistant 
strain will be “diluted out” by susceptible commensals.[23] However, in environments of high 
antibiotic usage susceptible isolates would lose their competitive advantage on the 
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background of low-level antimicrobial exposure to their drug resistant counterparts. This 
results in a dangerous imbalance in commensals with drug resistant genes.
[23]
  
Traditionally utilization of antibiotics has been much greater in developed countries. 
However two recent publications have shown the exponential rise in per capita utilization of 
antibiotics in developing countries over the last decade as these economies grow in the 
context of a relatively weak pharmaco-regulatory environment (Figure 1). 
[45,46]
 During the 
2000 – 2010 period global per capita consumption increased by 36% with South Africa and 
the other BRICS countries constituting 76% of this consumption growth.
[46]
 As can be seen in 
figure 1 below, per capita consumption has increased in South Africa by up to 12% between 
2000 and 2010.
[46]
 
 
Figure 1: Antibiotic usage per capita in 2000 and compounded annual growth in antibiotic consumption 2000 – 
2010   
Source: Boeckel
[46]
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Importantly, the healthcare sector is not the only major consumer of antibiotics. Of the 22.6 
million tons of antibiotics produced in the United States in 1998 only half was used by 
humans the remainder was consumed by the agricultural sector.
[47]
 Chemically, antibiotics are 
relatively stable allowing them to persist in active form in the environment for extended 
periods of time.
[23,47]
 With vast quantities of antibiotics dumped into the environment 
annually by the agricultural and healthcare sectors, the selection density and subsequent rise 
in resistance goes beyond the clinical setting and creates a deleterious ecology conducive to 
rising and worsening drug resistance
[47]
  and rising rates of drug resistant community-
acquired infections.
[48,49]
 Notably, a recent study by Walsh et al
[50]
 found wide spread 
dissemination of resistance mechanisms, including NDM-1, in environmental samples in 
India. These findings suggest that the transmission of resistance mechanisms between Gram-
negatives are not confined in vivo or even the hospital setting, but occur in the environment 
as well. 
2.4.3 Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae  
Resistance to multiple classes of antibiotics was first observed in Enterobacteriaceae in the 
1950’s and 1960’s.[51] Resistance to β-lactams is a long recognised problem in Gram-negative 
bacteria and Enterobacteriaceae.
[52]
 With the introduction of new classes of β-lactams, novel 
β-lactamases have emerged.[52,53] Carbapenem resistance, which renders organisms non-
susceptible to carbapenems and as such last-line treatment, has become a growing problem 
over the last decade with the emergence of readily transferable plasmid mediated 
carbapenem-hydrolysing β-lactamases.[54,6] These carbapenemases constitute a heterogeneous 
and versatile group of enzymes hydrolysing β-lactams and also exhibit resistance to β-
lactamase inhibitors such as piperacillin/tazobactam, making them exceedingly difficult to 
treat.
[6,55]
  
Infection with Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE’s) has been independently 
associated with an increase in in-hospital mortality.
[56]
 There is paucity in studies conducted 
to determine risk factors for acquiring CRE’s. A study conducted in Spain with 55 cases in 
2009 found mechanical ventilation, use of parental nutrition and exposure to linezolid and 
extended-spectrum cephalosporins to be independently associated with acquiring 
carbapenem-nonsusceptible Klebsiella pneumoniae.
[57]
 A German study with 13 cases 
conducted in 2006 showed severity of underlying disease and haemodialysis to be important 
risk factors for acquiring carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii.
[58]
 In a Brazilian 
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study involving a total of 86 cases, invasive medical devices (mechanical ventilation, urinary 
catheterisation and central venous catheterisation), hepatic transplantation, severity of 
underlying illness and exposure to carbapenems and/or third generation cephalosporins were 
associated with increased risk of acquiring carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii in 
an intensive care unit setting.
[59]
 
2.4.4 New Delhi Metallo- β-lactamase 1 
In 2008 a novel carbapenemase in the metallo-β-lactamase class designated New Delhi 
metallo-β-lactamase (NDM-1) was identified in a Swedish patient returning from India.[5] 
The first case of NDM-1 in South Africa was identified in September 2011.
[7]
 blaNDM-1 is 
plasmid mediated and associated with numerous other resistance determinants conferring 
resistance to β-lactams, fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides resulting in significant 
treatment option limitations.
[6,60]
 Sensitivity to tigecycline and polymyxins (e.g. colistin) are 
typically reserved although the efficacy of these treatment options have not been established 
and drug toxicity particularly with colistin poses further clinical challenges.
[61]
 Compared to 
other carbapenemase types, NDM-1 displays a broader spectrum of antimicrobial resistance 
and its global spread has been singularly rapid; notably, it has been detected in diverse 
species and genera of Gram-negative bacteria.
[62,63]
 NDM-1-producers have been documented 
on every continent except Antarctica,
[64–66]
 with increasing reports of transmission and 
acquisition of NDM-1-producers both in healthcare facilities and in the community.
[67,68]
  
In Europe, NDM-1 has been most commonly associated with K. pneumoniae and E. coli with 
a total of 77 cases reported across 13 countries from 2008 – 2010.[9] From these cases, 
increased risk for NDM-1 infection has been associated with the presence of underlying co-
morbid disease, history of invasive medical procedures, and a travel history to the Indian 
subcontinent (India and Pakistan) or Balkan states, especially if medical treatment was 
received.
[9]
 NDM-1 has been detected in a number of African countries, however risk factors 
for NDM-1 acquisition and mortality associated with NDM-1 is based on evidence from 
isolated cases or case-series only.
[7,69,70]
 With limited treatment options available, slowing 
and preventing the spread of blaNDM-1 will depend on an understanding of risk factors for its 
acquisition.  
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2.5 NDM-1 in South Africa 
The National Institute for Communicable Diseases houses a national reference laboratory for 
antimicrobial resistance, the Antimicrobial Resistance Reference Laboratory (ARRL). Since 
November 2011 laboratories across the country have been encouraged to send possible 
carbapenem resistant isolates for molecular testing to the ARRL. However, isolates are not 
routinely sent currently. Surveillance data from the ARRL have been published in the 
monthly NICD Communiqué.
[71]
  
Analysis of the data published in the Communiqué (June 2012 – August 2014) shows that 
between November 2011 and April 2013 a total of 37 NDM-1 cases had been identified 
nationally. These cases were from the private sector in Gauteng Province. There was a 
dramatic increase in the number of NDM-1 cases from May 2013 progressively affecting the 
public sector more than the private sector (Figure 2). Public sector cases have been reported 
from Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, the Western Cape and the Free State. Private sector cases are 
primarily from Gauteng with an increasing trend in the number of cases reported from 
KwaZulu Natal over the period December 2013 to July 2014. 
 
Figure 2: NDM-1 cases identified nationally by the NICD ARRL May 2013 - July 2014: Public and Private  
Source: Compiled from data extracted from the NICD monthly Communiqué 
As illustrated in figure 2, the trend in case detection suggests that although NDM-1 was first 
identified in the private sector (the first 37 cases were confined to the private sector in 
Gauteng, not shown in figure 2) it has become an increasingly significant problem in the 
public sector. Earlier identification and subsequent containment of NDM-1 could conceivably 
have reduced the expeditious spread of NDM-1 to the public sector and across the country. 
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Data from the ARRL should be treated with caution as reporting is voluntary which probably 
results in an underestimation of the true extent of the spread of NDM-1 in South Africa, 
particularly in the private sector. Further these data only provides information on place 
(province and sector private/public) and time, lacking any demographic or clinical 
information on patients from which the isolate was collected.  Lastly, available surveillance 
data on NDM-1 in South Africa has not been analysed to identify risk factors for its 
acquisition or associated morbidity and mortality. 
2.6 Measuring risk factors for Healthcare Associated Infections 
The case-control study design is commonly used in epidemiological studies to identify risk 
factors for rare outcomes as well as in investigating healthcare associated infections.  
In a systematic review of case-control studies investigating healthcare associated infections, 
Harris et al identify three important epidemiological considerations in designing studies, 
namely i) selection of the control group; ii) adjusting for time at risk; and iii) adjusting for co-
morbid disease.
[72]
  
Controls must be selected from the source population which gave rise to cases and control 
selection should be independent from exposures; namely, controls must be at risk of 
developing the outcome of interest but their selection should not be influenced by exposures 
of interest.
[72,73]
 It is advised not to select, as controls, patients with a sensitive strain of the 
organism under consideration as this will over-estimate the effect of antibiotic exposure.  
Time at risk is an important confounder and must be adjusted for at either the design phase 
(through matching) or the analysis phase. For controls, time at risk is defined as the time from 
admission to discharge or death and for cases it is defined as from the time of admission to 
time of diagnosis.
[72]
  
In order to account for underlying co-morbid disease, which may be causally related to the 
acquisition of drug resistant organisms, Harris et al 
[72]
 suggest matching or adjusting for it in 
the analysis phase.  
The Charlson co-morbidity index was developed from cohort data assessing mortality rates 
for various co-morbid conditions.
[74]
 Depending on the expected mortality rate for the co-
morbidity present in the patient, points are assigned from which a score is calculated. The 
score can then be converted into 10-year predicted mortality and as such allows for a 
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composite measure of co-morbidity. The Charlson score has been validated as a predictor for 
mortality, but has not formally been validated for its ability to adjust for confounding due to 
co-morbid disease.
[72]
 However, the Charlson score has been widely used to account for co-
morbid illness in studies investigating healthcare associated infections,
[75–77]
 and therefore is 
utilized in this study to account for co-morbid disease.  
Mortality Probability Models (MPM) were developed using multi-centre cohort data of 
patients admitted to intensive care units and aims to predict mortality at 24 hours after 
admission.
[78]
 MPM score calculation is based on fifteen clinical parameters taken on 
admission into an intensive care unit and is expressed as a probability, thus providing a 
composite score of a patient’s acute presentation.[78] MPM scores only apply to ICU patients 
and have not been validated for persons under the age of 18 years, with acute myocardial 
infarction, cardiac surgery patients or patients with burns.
[78]
 A core utility of the MPM score 
is for research and it has been used to adjust for acute presentation in a number of studies 
investigating risk factors for and mortality associated with nosocomial infections.
[79,80]
  
Survival probabilities calculated from the MPM and Charlson scores therefore provide a 
measure of acute presentation and underlying co-morbidities respectively. The methods 
section of this report will further expand on the calculation of both these measures.  
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CHAPTER III: METHODS  
3.1 Study design 
A matched case-control study was conducted following an outbreak investigation.  
3.2 Setting 
The outbreak consisting of a total of 105 cases of NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae 
occurred during a 17 month period (1 June 2011 to 31 October 2012) across three private 
hospitals in South Africa with strong referral links amongst them. This study was confined to 
the hospital where the majority of cases (90/105, 86%) were detected. The hospital has a total 
of 322 beds of which 37 beds are intensive care beds. It offers specialist tertiary-level care, 
acting as a referral hospital for surrounding private hospitals belonging to the same company.  
In early August 2011 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolated from an 86-year-old male admitted 
following a hip fracture was found to harbour blaNDM-1. In response to this, the first case of 
NDM-1 both in the hospital and the country, a rectal screening programme was instituted to 
identify patients colonised with NDM-1-producers, with screening criteria revisions 
throughout the course of the outbreak. The method of screening employed by all diagnostic 
laboratories throughout the outbreak was direct real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) testing for blaNDM-1 on dry rectal swabs. Clinical isolates demonstrating phenotypic 
resistance to carbapenems were also tested for blaNDM-1 using RT-PCR. All microbiological 
testing was conducted in routine private diagnostic laboratories servicing the private 
healthcare sector. 
All cases identified through the hospital screening programme during the initial outbreak 
investigation were reviewed and classified as suspected or confirmed cases as per the 
definitions in table 1. 
Table 1: Case definition utilized during the initial outbreak investigation 
Term Definition 
Suspected case Isolation of any Enterobacteriaceae – family genus or species from a screening or 
clinical specimen showing resistance to carbapenems as determined by the 
following antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) methods:  disk diffusion, MIC, 
or E-test.   
Confirmed case Presence of NDM-1 resistance gene in a screening specimen/clinical 
specimen/isolate as determined by RT-PCR methods.   
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3.3 Study population and sampling 
The study population included all patients admitted to the hospital during the study period 1 
June 2011 to 31 October 2012. 
All 90 cases identified at the hospital through the screening programme were included in the 
description of the outbreak (Objective 1) with a subsequent matched case control study 
involving a subset of the 90 cases employed to identify risk factors for the acquisition of 
NDM-1 infection and associated in-hospital mortality (Objective 2 – 5).  
3.3.1 Selection of cases and controls 
For the case-control study the case definition that had been used during the outbreak 
investigation was refined as reflected in table 2 below. Only confirmed cases, as per table 2, 
were eligible for inclusion in the case-control study. Cases were defined as patients in whom 
blaNDM-1 was detected on an isolate from a specimen collected at least 48 hours after 
admission and the infection was categorised as a healthcare-associated infection as per the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Healthcare Safety Network 
definitions.
[81]
 Potential cases were excluded if blaNDM-1 was detected on rectal screening 
alone, or where clinical records were incomplete.  
Table 2: Case definition utilized in the case-control study  
Term Definition 
Suspected case  isolation of any Enterobacteriaceae – family genus or species from a clinical 
specimen showing resistance to carbapenems as determined by the following 
antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) methods:  disk diffusion, MIC, or E-test. 
Isolate must have been identified at least 48 hours after admission and cause 
invasive disease (CDC guidelines) Pseudomonas and Acinetobacter - excluded  
Confirmed case  presence of NDM-1 resistance gene in a clinical isolate collected at least 48 hours 
after admission as determined by PCR methods and classified as causing invasive 
disease as per CDC guidelines  
 
As shown in figure 3 below, after exclusion of cases not fulfilling the inclusion criteria, 40 
cases remained and three controls were matched to each case for: 
i. sex (male/female); 
ii. age (+/- 5 years); 
iii. date of hospital admission (+/- 14 days); and 
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iv. Intensive care unit admission (yes/no).  
Where more than three eligible controls were identified on the hospital’s electronic database, 
three controls were randomly selected. Controls were excluded if they had blaNDM-1 detected 
on any sample during the hospitalisation period, if patient records were incomplete or 
missing, or if the patient was admitted for less than 48 hours.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Outline of study design and selection of cases and controls 
No controls could be found meeting the matching criteria for two cases and both these cases 
were therefore excluded from the analysis. For three cases only two matching controls could 
be identified. Another 52 controls were excluded for missing/incomplete medical records 
(n=26), record of screening NDM-1 positive on dry rectal swab (n=13) or being admitted for 
less than 48 hours (n=13). The final sample for the case-control study consisted of 38 cases 
and 68 controls. 
90 NDM-1 positive 
patients  
50 cases excluded:  
44: No RT-PCR 
confirmation of NDM-
1/NDM-1 positive on rectal 
swab only/ diagnosed < 48 
hours after admission; 
6: Incomplete records;  
40 cases included  
Case identification 
and exclusion  
Selection of 
controls  
Final sample  
120 matched controls  
40 cases included  52 controls excluded: 
 26: Incomplete medical 
records; 
13: Screened NDM-1 
positive; and 
13: Duration of hospital 
stay < 48hours 
 
68 controls for analysis: 
3:1 matching for 8 cases; 
2:1 matching for 14 cases;  
1:1 matching for 16 cases 
 
  
38 cases for analysis  
2 cases excluded: 
no matching controls 
could be identified 
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3.4 Measurement 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
In order to describe the initial outbreak data on all 90 potential cases were collected during 
August – November 2012. Variables collected to describe the outbreak include date of 
hospital and ICU admission, date of NDM-1 diagnosis, date of discharge from hospital or 
ICU, date of (in-hospital) death, site of NDM-1 infection and NDM-1 producing isolates 
(speciation). The total number of general and ICU admission per week from 1 June 2011 to 
31 October 2012 were also collected to calculate attack rates for the hospital overall and the 
ICU in particular. Data on the following variables specifically required for matching were 
also collected: ICU admission, sex and age. 
Description of cases and controls involved the collection of travel, previous hospitalization 
and clinical data. All the above variables were also collected for controls. Additional 
independent variables collected for both cases and controls were inputs for the calculation of 
MPM III and Charlson co-morbidity index scores (see table 3 and 4 below); past travel 
history; history of past hospitalization or chronic care; number of doses of a carbapenem, 
aminoglycoside, 3
rd 
/4
th
 generation cephalosporin, fluoroquinolone, piperacillin/tazobactam 
and corticosteroids received; number of days of mechanical ventilation, urinary 
catheterization; central venous line; haemodialysis and parenteral nutrition received. Surgical 
history including history of receiving an endoscopic procedure and extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenation were also collected. All in-hospital deaths were recorded. 
Data for both cases and controls were collected from four sources:  
I. Clinical records were reviewed and data were extracted using a data collection 
tool  
II. Billing records were obtained from the hospital and compared to the data obtained 
from the clinical record review.  
III. Laboratory investigation results were obtained from private laboratories servicing 
the hospital.  
IV. Structured telephonic interviews were conducted to determine previous travel 
history, previous hospital or chronic care admission. 
 
17 | P a g e  
 
3.4.2 Data variables 
Table 5 below provides a summary of the variables collected and the data sources.  
3.4.2.1 Dependent variables: 
The two primary outcome variables of interest were i) NDM-1 infection as defined in section 
3.3.1 above; and ii) death which was defined as any case of death in-hospital before 
discharge. 
3.4.2.2 Independent variables: 
Exposure data for cases were collected from the date of admission until the date of collection 
of the first sample yielding an NDM-1-producing isolate (time at risk). For controls, exposure 
data were collected from the date of admission until the date of discharge or death (time at 
risk).  
Previous travel and previous hospital/chronic care admission were collected through 
telephonic interviews and refer to the 12 months leading up to the index admission.  
Length of stay refers to the total length of hospital stay and was captured in days. Length of 
ICU stay was also captured in days and refers to the total duration of ICU stay. Data on select 
medical devices and procedures were collected based on previously reported risk factors for 
healthcare associated infection in the literature. These include the number of days a patients 
had a central venous line or a urinary catheter in situ; the number of days a patient was 
mechanically ventilated; received parenteral nutrition or haemodialysis. Receipt of 
extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) was recorded as yes or no. 
Antibiotics received during admission were recorded as number of doses received. All 
carbapenems (ertapenem, imipenem, doripenem); aminoglycosides (amikacin, gentamycin, 
tobramycin); fluoroquinolones (levofloxacin, ciprofloxacin, moxifloxacin); third and fourth 
generation cephalosporins (cefepime, ceftriaxone) and piperacillin/tazobactam doses were 
recorded. 
Surgical records were also reviewed and categorized as abdominal/thoracic surgery versus 
other (mainly orthopedic)/no surgery. Similarly, patients who had undergone endoscopic 
procedures were recorded as endoscopy yes versus no endoscopy. Patients’ HIV status was 
captured from clinical or laboratory records and recorded as a binary variable: HIV positive 
or HIV negative.  
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3.4.2.2.1 Components of Charlson co-morbidity index 
The Charlson co-morbidity index, from which 10 year survival probabilities can be 
calculated, require information on 16 co-morbid conditions. Each co-morbidity (and 
depending on the severity, e.g. diabetes with and without end organ damage) a score is given 
as per table 3 below. These scores are then added up to give an age-unadjusted Charlson co-
morbidity index. The index can be adjusted for age by adding additional points depending on 
the patient’s age.  
Table 3: Co-morbidity components and scoring of Charlson co-morbidity index   
Score Co-morbidity component 
1 
 
Myocardial Infarction (history only, no ECG changes required) 
Congestive cardiac failure 
Peripheral vascular disease (including aortic aneurysm of  > 6 cm) 
Cerebrovascular disease 
Dementia 
Chronic pulmonary disease 
Connective tissue disease 
Peptic ulcer disease 
Mild liver disease (includes chronic hepatitis, no portal hypertension present) 
Diabetes without end organ damage (exclude if controlled on diet alone) 
2 
 
Hemiplegia 
Moderate or severe renal disease 
Diabetes with end organ damage (Nephropathy, neuropathy or retinopathy) 
Any non-metastatic solid tumour (exclude if tumour free for > 5 years) 
Acute or chronic Leukaemia  
Malignant lymphoma 
3 Moderate or severe liver disease (signs of portal hypertension) 
6 
 
Metastatic solid tumour 
AIDS (not just HIV positive, WHO criteria) 
Adjusting for Age 
0 < 40 years of age 
1 41 – 50 years 
2 51 – 60 years 
3 61 – 70 years 
4 > 70 years of age 
 
3.4.2.2.2 Components of MPM score 
Table 4 provides the 16 components required to calculate MPM-III scores. Based on whether 
a clinical or physiological component was present at the time of ICU admission or not a 
probability of in-hospital mortality is calculated (MPM score). The MPM score is calculated 
utilizing weighted beta-coefficients. These coefficients were estimated from the ICU and 
mortality data of some 125 000 ICU patients across 135 ICU’s.[82]   
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Table 4: Components required for the calculation of MPM scores 
Components Present Yes/No 
Medical or unscheduled surgical admission  
CPR prior to admission  
Coma (GCS 3-5) 
1
   
Tachycardia (HR >150 bpm)  
Hypotension (SBP <90 mmHg)  
Mechanical ventilation within 60 minutes of admission  
Acute renal failure 
2 
 
Cardiac dysrhythmias  
Cerebrovascular accident  
Intracranial mass effect  
Gastrointestinal bleeding  
Metastatic carcinoma
 3 
 
Cirrhosis  
Chronic renal insufficiency 
4 
 
Zero factors
 5 
 
Full code status 
6 
 
1doesn’t include patients whose coma due to overdose or neuromuscular blockade; 2doesn’t include pre-renal azotemia; 
3distant metastasis only, doesn’t include lymph node involvement; 4long-standing creatinine > 177 μmol/L; 5elective surgical 
patients with no other MPM risk factors other than age; 6decision taken to resuscitate if necessary 
  
Table 5 below provides a summary of all the variables collected for this study, including data 
sources, definitions and key considerations in data management.  
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Table 5: Description of variables 
Variable Definition Management Source Characteristics 
Number of potential 
cases 
Either a suspected or a 
confirmed case as per 
definitions in table 1 
Described as 
cases per week 
Review of 
clinical records 
Count 
Number of cases Confirmed cases as per 
definition in table 2 
Utilized in case 
control study 
Review of 
clinical records 
Count 
Number of general 
hospital admissions 
All patients admitted to 
the hospital between 1 
June 2011 to 31 October 
2012 
Calculation of 
attack rates 
Hospital 
electronic 
admission 
database 
Count 
Number of ICU 
admissions 
All patients admitted to 
the hospital’s ICU 
between 1 June 2011 to 31 
October 2012 
Calculation of 
attack rates 
Hospital 
electronic 
admission 
database 
Count 
Date of hospital 
admission 
Date on which patient was 
first admitted as an 
inpatient 
 Clinical Records Date 
Date of ICU admission Date on which patient was 
first admitted to ICU 
 Clinical Records Date 
Date of NDM-1 
diagnosis 
Date on which NDM-1 
producing isolate was 
collected from the patient 
 Clinical Records Date 
Date of discharge Date on which patient left 
the hospital 
 Clinical Records Date 
Date of death Date on which patient 
passed away (if 
applicable), refers to in-
hospital deaths only. 
 Clinical Records Date 
Length of hospital stay Total duration of hospital 
stay 
Calculated from 
date of admission 
to death/discharge 
expressed in days 
Clinical Records Continuous (days) 
Length of ICU stay Total duration of ICU stay Calculated from 
date of ICU 
admission to 
death/discharge 
in/from ICU 
expressed in days 
Clinical Records Continuous (days) 
Time at risk Cases: date of admission 
until the date of NDM-1 
diagnosis  
Controls: the date of 
admission until the date of 
discharge or death 
Calculated from 
date of admission 
to date of NDM-1 
diagnosis or date 
of discharge/death  
Clinical Records Continuous (days) 
Time to NDM-1 
detection 
Duration in days from 
time of admission to date 
of NDM-1 diagnosis 
Calculated from 
date of hospital 
admission to date 
of NDM-1 
diagnosis 
Clinical Records Continuous (days) 
Number of deaths All patients included in the 
study whom died in-
hospital, namely before 
being discharged 
Stratified by 
presence of 
NDM-1 infection, 
namely cases and 
controls 
Clinical Records  
NDM-1 producing 
isolates 
Speciation of isolate found 
to be harbouring blaNDM-1 
 Clinical Records Nominal 
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Table 5 continue     
Site of NDM-1 infection Based on review of 
clinical records and CDC 
criteria,
[81]
 the site of 
primary infection 
 Clinical Records Nominal 
Travel History in the 12 months 
leading up to the date of 
hospital admission of 
travel outside the borders 
of the Republic of South 
Africa 
 Telephonic 
Interview 
Binary 
Previous 
hospitalization/ 
Chronic care
 
Admission to any hospital 
or chronic care facility in 
the 12 months leading up 
to the date of hospital 
admission 
 Telephonic 
Interview 
Binary 
Central venous line Number of days an 
intravenous cannula, 
placed into the femoral, 
internal jugular or 
subclavian vein was in-situ 
Cumulative 
number of days 
Clinical records Continuous (days) 
Urinary catheter Number of days an 
indwelling urinary catheter 
was in-situ 
Cumulative 
number of days 
Clinical records Continuous (days) 
Mechanical ventilation Number of days of patient 
required intubation and 
mechanical ventilation. 
Excludes, for example 
continuous positive airway 
pressure (CPAP) without 
concomitant intubation   
Cumulative 
number of days 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous (days) 
Extra-corporeal 
membrane oxygenation 
(ECMO) 
Receipt of any ECMO  Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Binary 
Parenteral nutrition Number of days of partial 
or total parenteral nutrition 
Cumulative 
number of days 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous (days) 
Haemodialysis Number of days a patient 
received haemodialysis 
Cumulative 
number of days 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous (days) 
Carbapenem 
 
Number of doses of 
ertapenem, meropenem 
and doripenem received  
Cumulative 
number of doses 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous 
(doses) 
Aminoglycosides Number of doses of 
amikacin, gentamycin and 
tobramycin received 
Cumulative 
number of doses 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous 
(doses) 
Fluoroquinolone Number of doses of 
levofloxacin, ciprofloxacin 
and moxifloxacin received 
Cumulative 
number of doses 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous 
(doses) 
Piperacillin/tazobactam   Number of doses of 
piperacillin/tazobactam 
received 
Cumulative 
number of doses 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous 
(doses) 
3/4
th
 generation 
Cephalosporin 
Number of doses of 
cefepime and ceftriaxone 
received 
Cumulative 
number of doses 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous 
(doses) 
Steroids Number of doses of 
corticosteroids received 
Cumulative 
number of doses 
Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Continuous 
(doses) 
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Table 5 continue     
Surgery Having undergone 
abdominal/thoracic 
surgery versus other or no 
surgery 
 Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Binary 
Endoscopy Having undergone 
bronchoscopy, 
gastroscopy, cystoscopy or 
colonoscopy 
 Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Binary 
HIV status Any clinical or laboratory 
documentation indicating 
that the patient is HIV +, if 
none or unknown patient 
assumed HIV - 
 Clinical 
records/Billing 
data 
Binary 
MPM III score As per table 4  Clinical records Continuous 
(probability) 
Charlson score As per table 3  Clinical records Continuous  
Dead Died in hospital, namely 
refers to in- hospital 
mortality 
 Clinical records Binary 
3.5 Data analysis 
3.5.1 Data Entry and Cleaning 
Data were entered into Epi-Info version 7 and exported to Microsoft Office Excel 2007 where 
it was inspected for errors before being imported to STATA Version 12
[83]
 for statistical 
analysis. Data were anonymised and original case investigation forms along with unique 
identifiers and supporting documentation (e.g. copies of laboratory reports) were filed in a 
locked filing cabinet at the National Institute of Communicable Diseases. Only the principle 
and co-investigators has access to these data.  
3.5.2 Data Analysis 
3.5.2.1 Description of the outbreak 
Data on all the potential cases (n=90) were utilised to illustrate NDM-1 attack rate trends per 
100 admissions (general and ICU) during the study period. For attack rates per 100 general 
admissions all potential cases (n=90) detected during each week were divided by the hospital 
admissions during that same week. Similarly, for attack rates per 100 ICU admissions all 
cases detected in ICU patients (n=83) during each week were divided by the number of ICU 
admission in that week. Further, data on the potential cases were used to draw a Gantt chart 
and epidemic curve. 
Average time to diagnosis of NDM-1 was calculated utilizing the variables date of hospital 
admission and date of NDM-1 diagnosis. Similarly, average length of hospital and ICU stays 
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were also calculated using date of hospital or ICU admission and date of hospital or ICU 
discharge respectively. Around these point estimates, 95% CI were calculated. 
Site of infection and NDM-1 producing isolates are described graphically through pie and or 
bar charts. 
3.5.2.2 Description of cases and controls 
Continuous variables such as length of hospital stay, MPM-III and Charlson scores, are 
described through the reporting of means and standard deviations. Two sided t-test for two 
groups (cases and controls) was used to compare means of continuous variables with normal 
distributions. Where data were not normally distributed Mann-Whitney U test was used. For 
differences in proportions such as previous hospitalisation or travel history, Mantel–Haenszel 
Chi square test was used.  
3.5.2.3 Factors associated with NDM-1 infection and in-hospital mortality 
Utilizing the data on the 38 cases and 68 matched controls, risk factors associated with case 
status were evaluated and in-hospital mortality between cases and controls were compared. 
Except for MPM-III scores, where its calculation would have been invalid, there were no 
missing clinical data in the final sample used for analysis. Where past admission, travel 
history or MPM-III scores were missing, observations were excluded from the analysis.    
Bivariate conditional logistic regression analysis was undertaken to calculate crude odds 
ratio’s for exposure to medical devises and interventions, antibiotics and duration of stay. 
Stepwise conditional logistic regression was conducted to identify predictors for case status. 
All exposure variables with a P < 0.20 at the univariate level were considered in the final 
multiple regression model. Significance was taken at a level of 0.05. Conditional logistic 
regression was further undertaken to calculate the odds of in-hospital mortality for cases and 
controls as well as for different sites of infection and clinical isolates. Adjusted odds ratios 
were calculated using multivariable conditional logistic regression.  
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
Verbal informed consent was obtained from all patients or their next of kin prior to 
conducting telephonic interviews which collected information on past hospitalization/chronic 
care admission and travel history. Verbal consent was obtained as this was a retrospective 
study and patients had subsequently relocated to various parts of the country. Consent was 
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captured on a consent form by the researchers. Consent to review clinical records were 
obtained from the hospital and all patient data were anonymized and de-linked from unique 
identifiers prior to analysis. Ethics approval for this study, including the consent procedure, 
was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical) at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. (M130248) 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
4.1    Description of the outbreak: 
4.1.1 Detection of NDM-1 
During the study period there were a total of 5 522 intensive care admissions and 31 644 
general admissions, with an average of ±1 500 general admissions per month. 
Figures 4 and 5 below illustrate the trend in NDM-1 detection during the study period for 
general and ICU admission respectively. Of the 105 cases 86 (82%) occurred at the hospital 
which was the site of this study. Of these 86 cases 83 (96.5%) required ICU admission at 
some point during their stay. The average detection rate between July 2011 and October 2012 
was 0.39 (95% CI 0.30 – 0.48) per 100 general admissions. There were four peaks in the 
detection rate per 100 general admissions  in March (week 31), July (week 49); September 
(week 58) and October (week 64) 2012.  
 
Figure 4: NDM-1detection: General admissions July 2011 to October 2012  
With the majority of cases detected in ICU (96.5%) the detection rate was high at 4.65 (95% 
CI 3.48 – 5.83) cases of NDM-1 per 100 ICU admission with four peaks  in November 2011 
(week 16), March (week 30), July (week 49) and September (week 59) 2012. In September 
2012 the outbreak reached a peak in terms of NDM-1 detection with approximately 1 in 5 
ICU patients testing positive for NDM-1. 
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Figure 5: NDM-1 detection: ICU admissions July 2011 to October 2012 
4.1.2 Epidemic curve 
Figure 6 shows the epidemic curve of all the 86 potential cases identified between July 2011 
and October 2012. The epidemic-curve suggests five distinct clusters, marked in figure 6 A 
through E.  
 
Figure 6: Epidemic curve of 86 potential NDM-1 cases  
Table 6 provides a summary of the five clusters. At 25 cluster D, a 16 week period between 
15 March and 14 July 2012, had the highest number of NDM-1 cases. At 2 cases per week 
cluster C had the highest average number of cases detected per week compared to an average 
of 1.39 cases per week over the entire study period.  
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Table 6: Number of cases detected by cluster 1 July 2011 to 31 October 2012 
Cluster Count Time period (dd/mm/yy) Number of Weeks Average number of cases 
per week 
A 5 01/7/11 – 14/08/11 6 0.83 
B 17 15/08/11 – 14/12/11 16 1.06 
C 24 15/12/11 – 14/03/12 12 2.00 
D 25 15/03/12 – 14/07/12 16 1.56 
E 15 15/07/12 – 31/10/12 12 1.25 
Total 86 01/07/11 – 31/10/12 62 1.39 
Figure 7 illustrates the date of admission to date of discharge (blue line) and the date of first 
NDM-1 detection (red dot) for all potential cases. There is clear temporal overlap between 
the cases.  
 
Figure 7: Gantt chart of NDM-1 cases detected from July 2011 to October 2012. 
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4.1.3 Average length of stay and time to diagnosis 
For all potential cases the average time from hospital admission to first detection of NDM-1 
was 17.2 days (CI 95% 12.7 – 21.7 days). Potential cases were admitted into an average of 
2.5 different wards (CI 95% 2.3 – 2.8 wards) during their stay and had an average hospital 
stay of 31.2 days (CI 95% 25.5 – 37.0 days; range 1 – 151 days). Of the 83 potential cases 
which received ICU care the average length of ICU stay was 19.1 days (CI 95% 14.1 – 24.0 
days; range 1 – 118 days).   
Crude mortality amongst the 86 potential cases was 32.56% (28/86) with the average time 
from NDM-1 diagnosis to death being 18.8 days (95 % CI 9.28 – 28.3 days).   
4.1.4 NDM-1 producing organisms and site of infection 
Of the 86 potential cases 51 had invasive disease, namely were not merely colonised with 
NDM-1 producing Gram-negatives. Figure 8 summarizes the site of infection. For the 
majority of these cases the primary site of infection was pneumonia (45%, n=23) followed by 
blood stream infections (35%, n=18), urinary tract infections (14%, n=7) and soft tissue 
infections (6%, n=3).  
  
Figure 8: Description of site of NDM-1 infection from outbreak (n=51 from June 2011 to October 2012) 
blaNDM-1 was detected on a clinical isolates in 53 of the 86 potential cases, the remaining 33 
cases were identified on a dry rectal swab without speciation. Of the 40 potential cases where 
speciation was done on a clinical isolate, most NDM-1 producers were found to Klebsiella 
Pneumoniae (39/53, 74%), followed by Enterobacter cloacae (6/53, 11%), Serratia 
45% 
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14% 
6% 
Pneumonia Blood Stream Infection 
Urinary Tract Infection Soft Tissue Infection 
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marcescence (3/53, 6%), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (2/53, 4%) and Klebsiella oxytoca, 
Citrobacter amalonaticus and Acinetobacter baumannii (1/53, 2% each). Figure 9 below 
provides a summary of these findings.  
  
Figure 9: Description of NDM-1 producing isolates from outbreak (n = 53, from June 2011 to October 2012) 
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4.2   Findings from the case-control study: 
4.2.1 Description of cases and controls 
The most common NDM-1-producing isolate among the 38 cases included in the case-control 
study was Klebsiella pneumoniae (28/38, 74%) followed by Enterobacter cloacae (5/38, 
13%), Klebsiella oxytoca (2/38, 5%), Serratia marcescens (2/38, 5%) and Citrobacter 
amalonaticus (1/38, 3%).     
 
Figure 10: Description of NDM-1 producing isolates 
With reference to figure 11, the most common site of infection was lower respiratory tract 
(20/38, 53%) followed by blood stream infections (13/38, 34%), urinary tract infections 
(3/38, 8%) and soft tissue infections (2/38, 5%).   
   
Figure 11: Site of infection with NDM-1 producing Gram negative 
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As shown in table 8, cases had on average a longer total length of hospital stay (44.0 vs 13.3 
days, P < 0.001) and longer durations of time at risk, particularly ICU time at risk (18.9 vs 
8.3 days, P <0 .001) than controls. Charlson co-morbidity index scores were significantly 
higher in cases than controls (5.2 vs 4.1, P = 0.032).  
Table 7: Duration of stay, time at risk and co-morbid status for cases and controls.  
 
 
4.2.2 Factors associated with NDM-1 infection 
As shown in Table 9, cases had significantly higher odds of having been hospitalised or 
admitted to a long-term care facility in the previous year (OR 6.83; 95% CI 2.32 – 20.16) or 
being transferred from a referral hospital (OR 4.98; 95% CI 1.56 – 15.93) compared to 
controls.  
No association was found between travel history and NDM-1 infection.  Although total time 
at risk was not associated with case status, an ICU stay of longer than seven days was 
associated with a significant risk of infection with NDM-1-producers (OR 4.82; 95% CI 1.80 
– 12.91).  
  
Variable Cases  
(n=38) 
Mean (SD) 
Controls  
(n=68) 
Mean (SD) 
p-value
 
Time at risk (total, days) 22.2 (±15.8) 13.3 (±9.5) 0.004 
Time at risk (intensive care, days) 18.9 (±13.7) 8.3 (±7.2) <0.001 
Total length of stay (days) 44.0 (±28.2) 13.3 (±9.5) <0.001 
Total length of ICU stay (days) 32.5 (±27.0) 8.3 (±7.2) <0.001 
MPM III Score (%) 11.5 (±7.1)
 
8.3 (±6.8)
 
0.072 
Age Adjusted Charlson Score
 
 5.2 (±3.1) 4.1 (±2.2) 0.032 
SD = standard deviation; time at risk: from admission to discharge/death (controls) or NDM-1 diagnosis 
(cases); MPM-III = Mortality Probability Model III; total length of stay: time from admission to 
discharge/death; p-values calculated using Mann-Whitney U test 
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Table 8: Univariate analysis of pre-hospital factors, HIV status, time at risk, surgery and antibiotic exposure 
among cases and controls.  
 
Exposure to any antibiotics (carbapenem, fluoroquinolone, aminoglycoside, third- or fourth-
generation cephalosporins, or piperacillin/tazobactam) was also significantly associated with 
case status (OR 4.77; 95% CI 1.38 – 16.48). No association was found between HIV status or 
surgery (laparotomy or thoracotomy) and infection with NDM-1-producers.  
On univariate analysis exposure to aminoglycosides, piperacillin/tazobactam and 
corticosteroids were significantly associated with case status (Table 10). Each additional dose 
of piperacillin/tazobactam or a corticosteroid was associated with a 5% increase in odds of 
developing infection with a NDM-1-producer, while each additional dose of an 
aminoglycoside was associated with a 3% increase in odds. Although exposure to 
fluoroquinolones, carbapenems and third-/fourth-generation cephalosporins were associated 
Exposure Variable 
Case patient 
(n=38) with exposure 
Control patient 
(n=68) with exposure Unadjusted 
OR (95%CI) 
p-value
 
Number % Number % 
Previous Hospitalization/Chronic 
care 
   No  
   Yes 
 
 
10 
24 
 
 
29 
71 
 
 
40 
8 
 
 
83 
17 
 
 
1 
6.83 (2.32 – 20.16) 
 
 
 
<0.001 
Travel History 
   No  
   Yes 
 
30 
2 
 
94 
6 
 
47 
1 
 
98 
2 
 
1 
3.24 (0.29 – 36.63) 
 
 
0.343 
Transfer from referral hospital 
   No 
   Yes 
 
23 
15 
 
61 
39 
 
60 
8 
 
88 
12 
 
1 
4.98 (1.56 – 15.93) 
 
 
0.007 
HIV Status 
   HIV negative 
   HIV positive 
 
34 
4 
 
89 
11 
 
63 
5 
 
93 
7 
 
1 
1.53 (0.29 – 8.11) 
 
 
0.615 
Time at risk (total) 
   ≤ 14 days 
   > 14 days 
 
17 
21 
 
45 
55 
 
44 
24 
 
65 
35 
 
1 
2.12 (0.97 – 4.62) 
 
 
0.059 
Time at risk (intensive care) 
   1 – 7 days 
   >7 days 
 
9 
29 
 
24 
76 
 
40 
28 
 
59 
41 
 
1 
4.82 (1.80 – 12.91) 
 
 
0.002 
Surgery* 
   No 
   Yes 
 
14 
24 
 
37 
63 
 
33 
35 
 
49 
51 
 
1 
1.60 (0.72 – 3.56) 
 
 
0.254 
Exposure to antibiotics** 
   No 
   Yes 
 
5 
33 
 
13 
87 
 
27 
41 
 
40 
60 
 
1 
4.77 (1.38 – 16.48) 
 
 
0.014 
*Refers to laparotomy or thoracotomy; **Refers to receiving any dose or either a carbapenem or 
fluoroquinolone or aminoglycoside or third/fourth generation cephalosporin or piperacillin/tazobactam; OR = 
odds ratio 
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with increased odds of case status, none of these showed statistical significance at the 5% 
level.  Each additional day of exposure to a central venous line or indwelling urinary catheter 
was associated with an 8% and 7% increased odds of case status on univariate analysis 
respectively. Selected medical interventions were significantly associated with NDM-1-
producer infection, with a 16% and 27% increased odds for each additional day of 
haemodialysis and mechanical ventilation respectively (Table 10).  
Table 9: Univariate analysis of exposure to antibiotics, corticosteroids, invasive medical devices and selected 
medical interventions among cases and controls.   
Exposure Variable 
Case patient 
(n=38) with exposure 
Control patient 
(n=68) with exposure Unadjusted 
OR (95%CI) 
p-value
 
Mean, (SD) Mean, (SD) 
Aminoglycosides (dose, any) 
 
   Gentamycin  
   Amikacin 
   Tobramycin 
10.42 (±22.53) 
 
0.97 (±5.35) 
7.29 (±18.79) 
2.16 (±13.30) 
2.43 (±10.23) 
 
0.25 (±1.74) 
2.17 (±10.05) 
0 (±0) 
1.03 (1.00 – 1.06) 
 
1.07 (0.93 – 1.23) 
1.02 (0.99 – 1.06) 
- 
0.043 
 
0.320 
0.125 
- 
Fluoroquinolone (dose, any) 
 
  Ciprofloxacin 
  Levofloxacin 
  Moxifloxacin 
1.53 (±3.75) 
 
0.71 (±3.02) 
0.66 (±2.33) 
0.15  (±0.97) 
0.91(±2.76) 
 
0.16 (±1.00) 
0.49 (±2.32) 
0.26 (±1.32) 
1.09 (0.96 – 1.24) 
 
1.19 (0.90 – 1.57) 
1.07 (0.91 – 1.26) 
0.96 (0.67 – 1.38) 
0.162 
 
0.234 
0.429 
0.830 
Carbapenem (dose, any) 
 
  Doripenem 
  Ertapenem 
  Meropenem 
16.08(±29.93) 
 
6.16 (±18.43) 
1.39 (±4.03) 
8.52 (±16.74) 
5.59(±11.97) 
 
0.15(±1.21) 
1.22 (±3.56) 
4.22 (±11.17) 
1.02 (1.00 – 1.05) 
 
1.18 (0.96 – 1.46) 
0.99 (0.88 – 1.12) 
1.02 (0.99 – 1.05) 
0.062 
 
0.117 
0.930 
0.175 
Cephalosporin (dose, any) 
 
  Cefepime 
  Ceftriaxone 
2.5 (±7.07) 
 
1.68 (±6.43) 
0.82 (±2.82) 
2.19 (±6.0) 
 
0.51 (±3.07) 
1.67 (±4.93) 
1.00 (0.94 – 1.06) 
 
1.06 (0.96 – 1.16) 
0.93 (0.83 – 1.04) 
0.992 
 
0.240 
0.201 
Pip-tazobactam (dose) 11.03 (±12.10) 6.17 (±10.31) 1.05 (1.02 – 1.10) 0.015 
Steroids (dose, any) 23.5 (±23.93) 7.22 (±12.96) 1.05 (1.02 – 1.09) 0.003 
Invasive Medical Devices   
 
  Central venous line (days) 
  Urinary catheter (days) 
 
 
15.42 (±14.66) 
18.61 (±15.92) 
 
 
6.51 (±6.71) 
7.35 (±7.93) 
 
 
1.08 (1.03 – 1.13) 
1.07 (1.03 – 1.12) 
 
 
0.003 
0.001 
Medical Interventions  
 
  Mechanical Ventilation (days) 
  Parental Nutrition (days) 
  Haemodialysis (days) 
 
 
7.47 (±8.55) 
2.53 (±3.40) 
6.03 (±14.3) 
 
 
0.94 (±2.34) 
1.40 (±3.83) 
0.68 (±2.74) 
 
 
1.27 (1.10 – 1.48) 
1.07 (0.96 – 1.20) 
1.16 (1.01 – 1.33) 
 
 
0.001 
0.217 
0.030 
SD = standard deviation; OR = odds ratio. 
34 | P a g e  
 
The final multivariate analysis model showed that having an underlying co-morbid disease as 
measured by the Charlson co-morbidity index, having had mechanical ventilation and 
exposure to piperacillin/tazobactam were associated with NDM-1 infection (Table 11). 
Table 10: Multiple conditional logistic regression analysis for factors associated with NDM-1 infection 
Exposure Variable Adjusted OR (95% CI)* p-value 
Charlson co-morbidity index score 1.59 (1.15 – 2.18) 0.005 
Mechanical Ventilation (days) 1.32 (1.10 – 1.59) 0.003 
Piperacillin/tazobactam (dose) 1.08 (1.02 – 1.15) 0.013 
* Adjusted for Charlson co-morbidity index score, mechanical ventilation and piperacillin/tazobactam; OR = 
odds ratio 
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4.2.3 Mortality and excess length of stay associated with NDM-1 infection 
 
Table 12 summarises the findings of mortality and its association with NDM-1 infection. Of 
the 68 controls, 10 died in hospital (14.7%), while 21 of the 38 cases died in hospital 
(55.3%).  
After adjusting for co-morbid disease, having NDM-1 infection was associated with an 
eleven-fold higher risk of in-hospital mortality (AOR 11.29; 95% CI 2.57 – 49.60) compared 
to controls. Cases with bloodstream infections due to NDM-1-producers (AOR 8.84; 95% CI 
1.09 – 71.55), or where the organism harbouring the blaNDM-1 was Klebsiella pneumoniae 
(AOR 16.57; 95% CI 2.12 – 129.6) had a significantly higher likelihood of in-hospital 
mortality. 
Table 11: Risk factors associated with in-hospital mortality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Death (n=31) 
n (%) 
Unadjusted 
OR (95% CI) 
p-value Adjusted* 
OR (95% CI) 
p-value 
Case - Control 
   Control 
   Case 
 
10 (32) 
21 (68) 
 
1 
12.81 (2.94 – 55.82) 
 
 
0.001 
 
1 
11.29 (2.57 – 49.60) 
 
 
0.001 
Site of Infection 
  None 
  Pneumonia 
  BSI 
  Other 
 
10 (32) 
11 (36) 
8 (26) 
2 (6) 
 
1 
5.5e (-) 
9.03 (1.10 – 74.21) 
4.37 (0.37 – 51.24) 
 
 
0.994 
0.041 
0.240 
 
1 
3.54e(-) 
8.84 (1.09 – 71.55) 
3.51 (0.28 – 44.71) 
 
 
0.993 
0.041 
0.333 
Isolate 
  None 
  K. pneumoniae 
  Other GNB 
 
10 (32) 
16 (52) 
5 (16) 
 
1 
19.30 (2.50 – 148.83) 
6.36 (0.72 – 56.51) 
 
 
0.005 
0.097 
 
1 
16.57 (2.12 – 129.6) 
6.08 (0.69 – 53.90) 
 
 
0.007 
0.105 
*Adjusted for Charlson co-morbidity index; OR = odds ratio; BSI: Blood stream infection; GNB = Gram-negative bacteria 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
5.1 Discussion 
This is the largest epidemiological study investigating risk factors and in-hospital mortality 
associated with NDM-1 infection.
[10,11]
 Further to this, it is the single largest healthcare 
associated outbreak of NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae to date. After a discussion 
pertaining to the outbreak investigation, key findings from the case control study will be 
discussed in the context of available literature. 
5.1.1 Description of the outbreak 
The epidemiologic curve illustrated five clusters of cases with an approximate two week 
interval between clusters. Each cluster also, typically, had a peak of cases. This is in keeping 
with a propagating pattern. This pattern is associated with propagated spread, whereby a case 
is introduced into a susceptible population followed by person-to-person disease 
transmission. As the number of cases rise there is a concomitant reduction in the number of 
susceptible patients and the number of new cases decline. A reduction in the number of cases 
could also be explained by the effects of interventions aimed at halting transmission. During 
the “inter-peak lull” in cases, the disease is incubating. The incubation period can therefore 
be estimated as it would be approximately equal to the time difference between these 
peaks.
[84]
 
In the NDM-1 outbreak setting the epidemiological curve was constructed from all available 
cases detected during the outbreak, that is to say it includes patients colonised and infected 
with NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae. Incubation refers to the “...interval from receipt 
of infection to the time of onset of clinical illness”[85] and as colonisation means that the 
organism is present without causing disease, it would not be possible to estimate incubation 
periods for NDM-1 producing organisms from this epidemiological curve. However, it was 
estimated that the average time from admission to detection of NDM-1, either through rectal 
screening or from molecular testing on a clinical isolate, was approximately 17 days after 
admission which may inform screening programmes and the index of suspicion for NDM-1 
in a clinical setting. Even though the incubation period cannot be estimated from the 
epidemiological curve, the propagating pattern of the curve strongly suggests person to 
person spread. The majority of the patients, due to the severity of their illness, were immobile 
and therefore the most likely route of transmission during this outbreak was via the treating 
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healthcare workers. During the initial outbreak investigation an environmental sampling 
study, which included sampling the hands of healthcare workers, was conducted. This study 
showed that a number of healthcare workers working in the ICU’s where the majority of 
NDM-1 cases were cared for had high levels of contamination on their hands. The 
environmental sampling also found that a number of ventilation related equipment (e.g. t-
piece, suctioning equipment) and stationary (e.g. rulers) were contaminated with NDM-1 
producing K. pneumonia.  Transmission of nosocomial infections and subsequent outbreaks 
has also been well documented in the literature.
[86]
 The Gantt chart further showed that most 
of the cases were detected during or subsequent to ICU admission. Therefore it is most likely 
that the mode of transmission during this outbreak was patient-to-patient via the hands of 
healthcare workers and contaminated items in the ICU setting.  
5.1.1.1 Organisational context of the outbreak 
During the outbreak investigation weekly meetings were held between hospital management, 
clinicians working in the hospital, the primary private laboratory servicing the hospital, 
infection prevention and control nurse and the NICD outbreak team. There were significant 
organisational challenges to overcome in effectively addressing the outbreak. The media had 
run a number of stories on the outbreak and as such hospital management was increasingly 
concerned about a reputational risk as a result of the prolonged outbreak. Private laboratories 
held most of the infectious disease and laboratory medicine knowledge. These laboratories, 
however, service the hospital via doctors requesting laboratory testing with a “preferred 
laboratory provider”. Compensation for services rendered is based on fee-for-service. In this 
context, the advice from the private laboratories was to institute an expensive PCR based 
screening programme on dry rectal swab specimens. However, at the time of the outbreak 
there was no clear evidence to justify using dry rectal swab PCR testing for screening of 
NDM-1 and subsequent investigations have found the positive predictive value of these tests 
to be as low as 16%.
[87]
 Therefore the utility of testing needed to be rationalised within the 
context and resources of the setting, but those with the capacity to inform decision makers in 
a balanced way were conceivable driven by divergent (profit) interests. Similarly, doctors 
also operate on a fee-for-service structure and were averse to hospital management 
implementing measures which may interfere in any way with their clinical decision making. 
It was also apparent that there was a significant lack in the inter-disciplinary management of 
patients, often resulting in irrational treatment decisions with patients being on multiple 
antibiotics prescribed by different physicians. Another example of the lack of inter-
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disciplinary care is the fact there were no morbidity and mortality meeting or 
interdisciplinary ward rounds held at the hospital. In this context, compounded by the fee-for-
service and “preferred laboratory provider” enforcing measures to contain the outbreak like 
patient isolation and cohorting or the rational use of antibiotics, medical devises and ICU 
beds were exceedingly difficult to achieve. Clinicians are, further to this, not employed by the 
hospital and typically have a significant information/knowledge advantage compared to 
managers. It was therefore challenging from an organisational and managerial point of view, 
to effectively implement measures to reduce transmission and curb the outbreak.  
Therefore, it can be argued that current incentive structures, particularly in the private sector, 
may not be conducive to addressing the drivers of drug resistance and healthcare associated 
infections namely, reducing the utilization of intensive care, medical devises or antibiotics 
and may require broader systems reform to be adequately addressed.  These incentive 
structures can result in over-servicing through supply induced demand.
[88]
 Beyond the market 
failure however, unregulated and over utilization of antibiotics spurs on the insidious rise of 
drug resistance with significant consequence for the private and the public sector alike. 
Therefore it is imperative that broader systems consideration be given to change the 
environment in which clinicians make decisions. A regulatory mechanism through which to 
achieve this is already provided for in Section 78 of the National Health Act (2004)
[89]
 and 
the recently established Office of Standards Compliance.
[90]
 The National Core Standards 
(Domain 2) prioritises Patient Safety, Clinical Governance and Clinical Care and sub-domain 
2.6 provides standards for infection prevention and control specifically.
[91]
 
5.1.1.2 Surveillance of carbapenem producing Enterobacteriaceae 
As shown earlier in this report, cases of NDM-1 have rapidly spread across the country and to 
the public sector subsequent to the outbreak.  Experience from this NDM-1 outbreak 
investigation as well as from abroad
[56]
 has shown that once carbapenem resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae become established in a hospital, it is extremely difficult and expensive 
to eradicate. It is therefore essential that outbreak clusters are detected early through a well 
functioning surveillance system so that interventions can be put in place to halt spread both 
within the hospital and the region. This underscores the importance of surveillance which 
allows for the early identification of cases and in so doing provides an opportunity for 
reducing the total number of cases and resultant mortality. Findings from this study can be 
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used to inform a surveillance programme by informing which patients are at greatest risk for 
NDM-1 infection. 
5.1.2 Factors associated with NDM-1 infection 
Higher Charlson co-morbidity scores, mechanical ventilation and piperacillin/tazobactam 
exposure were found to be independent predictors for infection with NDM-1-producers. In-
hospital mortality was found to be significantly higher in patients with clinical infection due 
to NDM-1 producers compared to controls. These findings add evidence to support rational 
preventive and control measures. 
Three previously published papers reporting on risk factors for the acquisitions of NDM-1 in 
particular were identified. The first was a review of reported cases (n=77) across the 
European Union which, due to limited data availability, only found travel to India, Pakistan 
or the Balkans to be associated with NDM-1 acquisition.
[92]
 The second study was a case 
series (n=5) of a nosocomial  outbreak of carbapenem resistant Enterobacteriaceae 
harbouring  blaNDM-1 in Canada.
[10]
 The third study, with a cohort design, by Lowe et al.
[11]
 
investigated nosocomial transmission of NDM-1 to seven patients from two index cases and 
found exposure to fluoroquinolones, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole and carbapenems to be 
possible risk factors for NDM-1 acquisition.
[11]
 Similar to findings by Lowe et al.
[11]
  this 
study found both carbapenem and fluoroquinolone exposure to be associated, albeit not 
significantly, with subsequent clinical infection due to a NDM-1-producer. However, 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole exposure was not assessed in this study as it was not 
commonly prescribed in the setting of the outbreak. This is the first study to show a 
significant association between NDM-1 infection and exposure to aminoglycoside and 
piperacillin/tazobactam.  
Findings that an increased duration of exposure to central venous lines, urinary catheters, 
mechanical ventilation and haemodialysis were associated with an increased risk of infection 
with NDM-1-producers are consistent with risk factors for the acquisition of carbapenemase-
producers identified by previous investigators. For example, studies show that medical 
devices such as urinary catheters
[93,94]
 and central venous lines
[93–95]
 as well as interventions 
such as mechanical ventilation
[93,95,96]
 and haemodialysis
[93]
 are well-established risk factors 
for a range of carbapenemase-producers other than NDM-1. These factors have also been 
found to increase the risk of acquisition of IMP-type metallo-β-lactamase producing Gram-
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negatives.
[97,98]
 This is the first study that identifies and quantifies these exposures for NDM-
1-producers.  
Of the early NDM-1 cases detected in the United States and United Kingdom, many had 
epidemiological links to India and Pakistan.
[6,67]
 This present study found no association 
between international travel and NDM-1 acquisition. Despite not being able to complete the 
telephonic interview for all cases (32 completed/38, 84%) or controls (48 completed/68, 
71%), it is unlikely that international travel was a risk factor for NDM-1 acquisition in the 
cases linked to this nosocomial outbreak. Of the first five cases identified in the outbreak, 
none reported any travel history in the year preceding admission, and none of the cases 
interviewed telephonically reported travel to India, Pakistan or the Balkans, which had been 
identified as high NDM-1-transmission regions at the time of the outbreak.
[6,67]
 In India, 
Gram-negative bacteria surveillance isolates collected two years prior to the first 
identification of NDM-1 has subsequently been shown to harbour blaNDM-1.
[99]
 Similarly, 
given the lack of standardised surveillance in South Africa, it is likely that blaNDM-1 had been 
present in clinically-relevant bacteria for some time before the index case was identified.  
5.1.3 Mortality and excess length of stay associated with NDM-1 infection 
In-hospital mortality for extended-spectrum β-lactamase producers has been reported in other 
studies at around 37%
[100]
 and amongst patients with carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae at between 44% and 48%.
[93,96]
 Crude mortality in patients with bloodstream 
infections caused by KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae is estimated at 53%.
[101]
 Given 
these reported mortality rates and the limited treatment options available for NDM-1-
producers, our finding of a 55.3% crude in-hospital mortality rate was to be expected.  
However, considering this outbreak occurred in a well-resourced private sector hospital, 
mortality rates in patients with similar infections cared for in public sector hospitals in South 
Africa would be expected to be higher due to limited available antibiotics and ICU facilities. 
This would likely be the case in many under-resourced healthcare facilities worldwide, which 
further underscores the importance of taking preventive action to reduce transmission of such 
multidrug-resistant organisms in the hospital setting, thereby preventing nosocomial 
outbreaks and limiting dissemination into the community. 
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5.2  Limitations 
Due to the inherent nature of outbreak investigations, there were a limited number of 
potential cases. All potential cases were reviewed and as many matching controls as were 
available were included. However, the small sample size limits the study’s power to detect 
other antimicrobial agents as risk factors for infection with NDM-1-producers. The outbreak 
was confined to the adult ICU, limiting generalisability to a paediatric population. Missing 
clinical records and missing data on international travel and previous admissions in the year 
leading up to the admission of interest reduced our sample size and ability to evaluate pre-
hospitalization risk factors. The fluctuating point prevalence of NDM-1-producers and the 
clinicians’ enhanced diagnostic suspicion of infection with NDM-1-producers as the outbreak 
evolved may bias findings. This was, however, addressed by matching controls for date of 
hospital admission. Information bias could be present in the calculation of the odds ratio’s for 
past admission and travel history as these data were not complete for all cases and controls. 
Lastly the case-control design limits conclusions on causality. 
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CHAPTER VI: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.2    Conclusion  
NDM-1 infection is associated with significant in-hospital mortality. Risk factors for 
hospital-associated infection include the presence of co-morbid disease, mechanical 
ventilation and piperacillin/tazobactam exposure.  
Given the dearth of new antimicrobials in the drug development pipeline, the burgeoning 
threat of conquer by virtually untreatable multidrug-resistant organisms of clinical relevance 
is becoming realised thanks to the emergence and rapid spread of, amongst others, the 
carbapenemases.
[102,103]
 Through a better understanding of the risk factors and 
epidemiological characteristics of patients developing clinical infection with NDM-1-
producers, infection prevention and control practice and antimicrobial stewardship programs 
can be tailored to identify vulnerable patients and prioritise areas for risk reduction, both in 
an outbreak situation and beyond. This study contributes to a growing body of knowledge for 
action by identifying risk factors for infection with NDM-1-producers, and highlights the 
‘bottom line’ – such infections exact significant mortality and swift, effective action is 
needed.  
5.3   Recommendations 
 
Based on this report, a number of recommendations are put forward below.  
I. Surveillance and screening 
Hospital and laboratory based surveillance with obligatory reporting of carbapenem resistant 
Gram-negatives to the department of health are required. The current NICD surveillance 
system should be strengthened and capacitated to conduct molecular testing on all isolates 
reported with possible carbapenem resistance. Surveillance reports should be communicated 
to various stakeholders including the National and provincial departments of health as well as 
private sector hospitals so that appropriate action can be taken in timeous manner. 
National guidelines on screening for NDM-1 and other carbapenem resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae need to be developed and frequently revised based on the findings from 
this investigation, other studies and future findings. From this study screening should be 
targeted at ICU patients with extended stays of more than a week; with medical devises in 
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situ, particularly those requiring mechanical ventilation. Patients receiving antibiotics, 
particularly piperacillin/tazobactam, an aminoglycoside or a carbapenem should also be 
included in a screening programme.      
II. Infection prevention and control 
In-hospital spread needs to be reduced with a particular focus on hand hygiene. As noted in 
this report, the outbreak was probably spread from person-to-person via healthcare workers in 
the ICU setting. Hand hygiene needs to be taught and practiced by all healthcare workers and 
management must ensure easy access to appropriately equipped hand washing stations.  
Secondly, patients found to be harbouring NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae must be 
isolated and strict contact precautions must be maintained in order to reduce transmission to 
other patients and protect healthcare workers from being colonised with NDM-1 producing 
organisms. 
Thirdly, the utilization of ICU care and invasive medical devises must be rationalised. As 
shown in this study increased hospital and particularly ICU stay significantly increases risk of 
infection with NDM-1 producing Enterobacteriaceae. Further it was shown that medical 
devises are associated with acquisition of NDM-1. Therefore it is recommended that facilities 
as well as provincial/national department of health develop guidelines for ICU admission in 
an effort to reduce the utilization and possible exposure to drug resistant organisms. Further, 
guidelines on invasive medical devises should be developed and infection prevention and 
control practitioners should be equipped to monitor the utilization of devises and alert 
treating physicians if and when devices have been in situ for extended periods of time and 
require removal/replacement. 
III. Antibiotic stewardship 
 
As demonstrated in this study, exposure to antibiotics is an important risk factor associated 
with NDM-1 infection. Therefore, an essential component of addressing resistance is 
instituting antibiotic stewardship programmes at a national, sub-national and most 
importantly an institutional level. Antibiotic stewardship requires a multidisciplinary 
approach (clinicians, pharmacologists, managers, microbiologists and infection prevention 
and control specialists) to design, update and implement. It pertains to the utilization of the 
correct antimicrobial agent at the correct dose for the correct duration taking into account 
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possible selective pressures for resistance and drug toxicity.
[104]
 Therefore, antibiotic 
stewardship programmes require local epidemiological and resistance pattern data to be 
effective and relevant. Their effectiveness and relevance also depends on a continuous 
reassessment of evidence, practice and changing epidemiology. Forums such as 
multidisciplinary morbidity and mortality meeting should be leveraged and strengthened as 
platforms for developing and implementing antibiotic stewardship programmes.  
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